环境密钥管理
Env & Secrets Manager
by alirezarezvani
统一梳理dev/staging/prod的.env和密钥流程,自动生成.env.example、校验必填变量、扫描Git历史泄漏,并联动Vault、AWS SSM、1Password、Doppler完成轮换。
统一管理环境变量、密钥与配置,减少泄露和部署混乱,安全治理与团队协作一起做好,DevOps 场景很省心。
安装
claude skill add --url github.com/alirezarezvani/claude-skills/tree/main/engineering/env-secrets-manager文档
Tier: POWERFUL Category: Engineering Domain: Security / DevOps / Configuration Management
Overview
Complete environment and secrets management workflow: .env file lifecycle across dev/staging/prod, .env.example auto-generation, required-var validation, secret leak detection in git history, and credential rotation playbook. Integrates with HashiCorp Vault, AWS SSM, 1Password CLI, and Doppler.
Core Capabilities
- .env lifecycle — create, validate, sync across environments
- .env.example generation — strip values, preserve keys and comments
- Validation script — fail-fast on missing required vars at startup
- Secret leak detection — regex scan of git history and working tree
- Rotation workflow — detect → scope → rotate → deploy → verify
- Secret manager integrations — Vault KV v2, AWS SSM, 1Password, Doppler
When to Use
- Setting up a new project — scaffold .env.example and validation
- Before every commit — scan for accidentally staged secrets
- Post-incident response — leaked credential rotation procedure
- Onboarding new developers — they need all vars, not just some
- Environment drift investigation — prod behaving differently from staging
.env File Structure
Canonical Layout
# .env.example — committed to git (no values)
# .env.local — developer machine (gitignored)
# .env.staging — CI/CD or secret manager reference
# .env.prod — never on disk; pulled from secret manager at runtime
# Application
APP_NAME=
APP_ENV= # dev | staging | prod
APP_PORT=3000 # default port if not set
APP_SECRET= # REQUIRED: JWT signing secret (min 32 chars)
APP_URL= # REQUIRED: public base URL
# Database
DATABASE_URL= # REQUIRED: full connection string
DATABASE_POOL_MIN=2
DATABASE_POOL_MAX=10
# Auth
AUTH_JWT_SECRET= # REQUIRED
AUTH_JWT_EXPIRY=3600 # seconds
AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET= # REQUIRED
# Third-party APIs
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY= # REQUIRED in prod
STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET= # REQUIRED in prod
SENDGRID_API_KEY=
# Storage
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=
AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=
AWS_REGION=eu-central-1
AWS_S3_BUCKET=
# Monitoring
SENTRY_DSN=
DD_API_KEY=
.gitignore Patterns
Add to your project's .gitignore:
# Environment files — NEVER commit these
.env
.env.local
.env.development
.env.development.local
.env.test.local
.env.staging
.env.staging.local
.env.production
.env.production.local
.env.prod
.env.*.local
# Secret files
*.pem
*.key
*.p12
*.pfx
secrets.json
secrets.yaml
secrets.yml
credentials.json
service-account.json
# AWS
.aws/credentials
# Terraform state (may contain secrets)
*.tfstate
*.tfstate.backup
.terraform/
# Kubernetes secrets
*-secret.yaml
*-secrets.yaml
.env.example Auto-Generation
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/gen-env-example.sh
# Strips values from .env, preserves keys, defaults, and comments
INPUT="${1:-.env}"
OUTPUT="${2:-.env.example}"
if [ ! -f "$INPUT" ]; then
echo "ERROR: $INPUT not found"
exit 1
fi
python3 - "$INPUT" "$OUTPUT" << 'PYEOF'
import sys, re
input_file = sys.argv[1]
output_file = sys.argv[2]
lines = []
with open(input_file) as f:
for line in f:
stripped = line.rstrip('\n')
# Keep blank lines and comments as-is
if stripped == '' or stripped.startswith('#'):
lines.append(stripped)
continue
# Match KEY=VALUE or KEY="VALUE"
m = re.match(r'^([A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*)=(.*)$', stripped)
if m:
key = m.group(1)
value = m.group(2).strip('"\'')
# Keep non-sensitive defaults (ports, regions, feature flags)
safe_defaults = re.compile(
r'^(APP_PORT|APP_ENV|APP_NAME|AWS_REGION|DATABASE_POOL_|LOG_LEVEL|'
r'FEATURE_|CACHE_TTL|RATE_LIMIT_|PAGINATION_|TIMEOUT_)',
re.I
)
sensitive = re.compile(
r'(SECRET|KEY|TOKEN|PASSWORD|PASS|CREDENTIAL|DSN|AUTH|PRIVATE|CERT)',
re.I
)
if safe_defaults.match(key) and value:
lines.append(f"{key}={value} # default")
else:
lines.append(f"{key}=")
else:
lines.append(stripped)
with open(output_file, 'w') as f:
f.write('\n'.join(lines) + '\n')
print(f"Generated {output_file} from {input_file}")
PYEOF
Usage:
bash scripts/gen-env-example.sh .env .env.example
# Commit .env.example, never .env
git add .env.example
Required Variable Validation Script
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/validate-env.sh
# Run at app startup or in CI before deploy
# Exit 1 if any required var is missing or empty
set -euo pipefail
MISSING=()
WARNINGS=()
# --- Define required vars by environment ---
ALWAYS_REQUIRED=(
APP_SECRET
APP_URL
DATABASE_URL
AUTH_JWT_SECRET
AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET
)
PROD_REQUIRED=(
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY
STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET
SENTRY_DSN
)
# --- Check always-required vars ---
for var in "${ALWAYS_REQUIRED[@]}"; do
if [ -z "${!var:-}" ]; then
MISSING+=("$var")
fi
done
# --- Check prod-only vars ---
if [ "${APP_ENV:-}" = "production" ] || [ "${NODE_ENV:-}" = "production" ]; then
for var in "${PROD_REQUIRED[@]}"; do
if [ -z "${!var:-}" ]; then
MISSING+=("$var (required in production)")
fi
done
fi
# --- Validate format/length constraints ---
if [ -n "${AUTH_JWT_SECRET:-}" ] && [ ${#AUTH_JWT_SECRET} -lt 32 ]; then
WARNINGS+=("AUTH_JWT_SECRET is shorter than 32 chars — insecure")
fi
if [ -n "${DATABASE_URL:-}" ]; then
if ! echo "$DATABASE_URL" | grep -qE "^(postgres|postgresql|mysql|mongodb|redis)://"; then
WARNINGS+=("DATABASE_URL doesn't look like a valid connection string")
fi
fi
if [ -n "${APP_PORT:-}" ]; then
if ! [[ "$APP_PORT" =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]] || [ "$APP_PORT" -lt 1 ] || [ "$APP_PORT" -gt 65535 ]; then
WARNINGS+=("APP_PORT=$APP_PORT is not a valid port number")
fi
fi
# --- Report ---
if [ ${#WARNINGS[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
echo "WARNINGS:"
for w in "${WARNINGS[@]}"; do
echo " ⚠️ $w"
done
fi
if [ ${#MISSING[@]} -gt 0 ]; then
echo ""
echo "FATAL: Missing required environment variables:"
for var in "${MISSING[@]}"; do
echo " ❌ $var"
done
echo ""
echo "Copy .env.example to .env and fill in missing values."
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ All required environment variables are set"
Node.js equivalent:
// src/config/validateEnv.ts
const required = [
'APP_SECRET', 'APP_URL', 'DATABASE_URL',
'AUTH_JWT_SECRET', 'AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET',
]
const missing = required.filter(key => !process.env[key])
if (missing.length > 0) {
console.error('FATAL: Missing required environment variables:', missing)
process.exit(1)
}
if (process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET && process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET.length < 32) {
console.error('FATAL: AUTH_JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 characters')
process.exit(1)
}
export const config = {
appSecret: process.env.APP_SECRET!,
appUrl: process.env.APP_URL!,
databaseUrl: process.env.DATABASE_URL!,
jwtSecret: process.env.AUTH_JWT_SECRET!,
refreshSecret: process.env.AUTH_REFRESH_SECRET!,
stripeKey: process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY, // optional
port: parseInt(process.env.APP_PORT ?? '3000', 10),
} as const
Secret Leak Detection
Scan Working Tree
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/scan-secrets.sh
# Scan staged files and working tree for common secret patterns
FAIL=0
check() {
local label="$1"
local pattern="$2"
local matches
matches=$(git diff --cached -U0 2>/dev/null | grep "^+" | grep -vE "^(\+\+\+|#|\/\/)" | \
grep -E "$pattern" | grep -v ".env.example" | grep -v "test\|mock\|fixture\|fake" || true)
if [ -n "$matches" ]; then
echo "SECRET DETECTED [$label]:"
echo "$matches" | head -5
FAIL=1
fi
}
# AWS Access Keys
check "AWS Access Key" "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"
check "AWS Secret Key" "aws_secret_access_key\s*=\s*['\"]?[A-Za-z0-9/+]{40}"
# Stripe
check "Stripe Live Key" "sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}"
check "Stripe Test Key" "sk_test_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24,}"
check "Stripe Webhook" "whsec_[0-9a-zA-Z]{32,}"
# JWT / Generic secrets
check "Hardcoded JWT" "eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}"
check "Generic Secret" "(secret|password|passwd|api_key|apikey|token)\s*[:=]\s*['\"][^'\"]{12,}['\"]"
# Private keys
check "Private Key Block" "-----BEGIN (RSA |EC |DSA |OPENSSH )?PRIVATE KEY-----"
check "PEM Certificate" "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----"
# Connection strings with credentials
check "DB Connection" "(postgres|mysql|mongodb)://[^:]+:[^@]+@"
check "Redis Auth" "redis://:[^@]+@\|rediss://:[^@]+@"
# Google
check "Google API Key" "AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}"
check "Google OAuth" "[0-9]+-[0-9A-Za-z_]{32}\.apps\.googleusercontent\.com"
# GitHub
check "GitHub Token" "gh[ps]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}"
check "GitHub Fine-grained" "github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{82}"
# Slack
check "Slack Token" "xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z]{10,}"
check "Slack Webhook" "https://hooks\.slack\.com/services/[A-Z0-9]{9,}/[A-Z0-9]{9,}/[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}"
# Twilio
check "Twilio SID" "AC[a-z0-9]{32}"
check "Twilio Token" "SK[a-z0-9]{32}"
if [ $FAIL -eq 1 ]; then
echo ""
echo "BLOCKED: Secrets detected in staged changes."
echo "Remove secrets before committing. Use environment variables instead."
echo "If this is a false positive, add it to .secretsignore or use:"
echo " git commit --no-verify (only if you're 100% certain it's safe)"
exit 1
fi
echo "No secrets detected in staged changes."
Scan Git History (post-incident)
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/scan-history.sh — scan entire git history for leaked secrets
PATTERNS=(
"AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}"
"sk_live_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24}"
"sk_test_[0-9a-zA-Z]{24}"
"-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY-----"
"AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}"
"ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}"
"xox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z]{10,}"
)
for pattern in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
echo "Scanning for: $pattern"
git log --all -p --no-color 2>/dev/null | \
grep -n "$pattern" | \
grep "^+" | \
grep -v "^+++" | \
head -10
done
# Alternative: use truffleHog or gitleaks for comprehensive scanning
# gitleaks detect --source . --log-opts="--all"
# trufflehog git file://. --only-verified
Pre-commit Hook Installation
#!/bin/bash
# Install the pre-commit hook
HOOK_PATH=".git/hooks/pre-commit"
cat > "$HOOK_PATH" << 'HOOK'
#!/bin/bash
# Pre-commit: scan for secrets before every commit
SCRIPT="scripts/scan-secrets.sh"
if [ -f "$SCRIPT" ]; then
bash "$SCRIPT"
else
# Inline fallback if script not present
if git diff --cached -U0 | grep "^+" | grep -qE "AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|sk_live_|-----BEGIN.*PRIVATE KEY"; then
echo "BLOCKED: Possible secret detected in staged changes."
exit 1
fi
fi
HOOK
chmod +x "$HOOK_PATH"
echo "Pre-commit hook installed at $HOOK_PATH"
Using pre-commit framework (recommended for teams):
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
- repo: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks
rev: v8.18.0
hooks:
- id: gitleaks
- repo: local
hooks:
- id: validate-env-example
name: Check .env.example is up to date
language: script
entry: bash scripts/check-env-example.sh
pass_filenames: false
Credential Rotation Workflow
When a secret is leaked or compromised:
Step 1 — Detect & Confirm
# Confirm which secret was exposed
git log --all -p --no-color | grep -A2 -B2 "AKIA\|sk_live_\|SECRET"
# Check if secret is in any open PRs
gh pr list --state open | while read pr; do
gh pr diff $(echo $pr | awk '{print $1}') | grep -E "AKIA|sk_live_" && echo "Found in PR: $pr"
done
Step 2 — Identify Exposure Window
# Find first commit that introduced the secret
git log --all -p --no-color -- "*.env" "*.json" "*.yaml" "*.ts" "*.py" | \
grep -B 10 "THE_LEAKED_VALUE" | grep "^commit" | tail -1
# Get commit date
git show --format="%ci" COMMIT_HASH | head -1
# Check if secret appears in public repos (GitHub)
gh api search/code -X GET -f q="THE_LEAKED_VALUE" | jq '.total_count, .items[].html_url'
Step 3 — Rotate Credential
Per service — rotate immediately:
- AWS: IAM console → delete access key → create new → update everywhere
- Stripe: Dashboard → Developers → API keys → Roll key
- GitHub PAT: Settings → Developer Settings → Personal access tokens → Revoke → Create new
- DB password:
ALTER USER app_user PASSWORD 'new-strong-password-here'; - JWT secret: Rotate key (all existing sessions invalidated — users re-login)
Step 4 — Update All Environments
# Update secret manager (source of truth)
# Then redeploy to pull new values
# Vault KV v2
vault kv put secret/myapp/prod \
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY="sk_live_NEW..." \
APP_SECRET="new-secret-here"
# AWS SSM
aws ssm put-parameter \
--name "/myapp/prod/STRIPE_SECRET_KEY" \
--value "sk_live_NEW..." \
--type "SecureString" \
--overwrite
# 1Password
op item edit "MyApp Prod" \
--field "STRIPE_SECRET_KEY[password]=sk_live_NEW..."
# Doppler
doppler secrets set STRIPE_SECRET_KEY="sk_live_NEW..." --project myapp --config prod
Step 5 — Remove from Git History
# WARNING: rewrites history — coordinate with team first
git filter-repo --path-glob "*.env" --invert-paths
# Or remove specific string from all commits
git filter-repo --replace-text <(echo "LEAKED_VALUE==>REDACTED")
# Force push all branches (requires team coordination + force push permissions)
git push origin --force --all
# Notify all developers to re-clone
Step 6 — Verify
# Confirm secret no longer in history
git log --all -p | grep "LEAKED_VALUE" | wc -l # should be 0
# Test new credentials work
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $NEW_TOKEN" https://api.service.com/test
# Monitor for unauthorized usage of old credential (check service audit logs)
Secret Manager Integrations
HashiCorp Vault KV v2
# Setup
export VAULT_ADDR="https://vault.internal.company.com"
export VAULT_TOKEN="$(vault login -method=oidc -format=json | jq -r '.auth.client_token')"
# Write secrets
vault kv put secret/myapp/prod \
DATABASE_URL="postgres://user:pass@host/db" \
APP_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 32)"
# Read secrets into env
eval $(vault kv get -format=json secret/myapp/prod | \
jq -r '.data.data | to_entries[] | "export \(.key)=\(.value)"')
# In CI/CD (GitHub Actions)
# Use vault-action: hashicorp/vault-action@v2
AWS SSM Parameter Store
# Write (SecureString = encrypted with KMS)
aws ssm put-parameter \
--name "/myapp/prod/DATABASE_URL" \
--value "postgres://..." \
--type "SecureString" \
--key-id "alias/myapp-secrets"
# Read all params for an app/env into shell
eval $(aws ssm get-parameters-by-path \
--path "/myapp/prod/" \
--with-decryption \
--query "Parameters[*].[Name,Value]" \
--output text | \
awk '{split($1,a,"/"); print "export " a[length(a)] "=\"" $2 "\""}')
# In Node.js at startup
# Use @aws-sdk/client-ssm to pull params before server starts
1Password CLI
# Authenticate
eval $(op signin)
# Get a specific field
op read "op://MyVault/MyApp Prod/STRIPE_SECRET_KEY"
# Export all fields from an item as env vars
op item get "MyApp Prod" --format json | \
jq -r '.fields[] | select(.value != null) | "export \(.label)=\"\(.value)\""' | \
grep -E "^export [A-Z_]+" | source /dev/stdin
# .env injection
op inject -i .env.tpl -o .env
# .env.tpl uses {{ op://Vault/Item/field }} syntax
Doppler
# Setup
doppler setup # interactive: select project + config
# Run any command with secrets injected
doppler run -- node server.js
doppler run -- npm run dev
# Export to .env (local dev only — never commit output)
doppler secrets download --no-file --format env > .env.local
# Pull specific secret
doppler secrets get DATABASE_URL --plain
# Sync to another environment
doppler secrets upload --project myapp --config staging < .env.staging.example
Environment Drift Detection
Check if staging and prod have the same set of keys (values may differ):
#!/bin/bash
# scripts/check-env-drift.sh
# Pull key names from both environments (not values)
STAGING_KEYS=$(doppler secrets --project myapp --config staging --format json 2>/dev/null | \
jq -r 'keys[]' | sort)
PROD_KEYS=$(doppler secrets --project myapp --config prod --format json 2>/dev/null | \
jq -r 'keys[]' | sort)
ONLY_IN_STAGING=$(comm -23 <(echo "$STAGING_KEYS") <(echo "$PROD_KEYS"))
ONLY_IN_PROD=$(comm -13 <(echo "$STAGING_KEYS") <(echo "$PROD_KEYS"))
if [ -n "$ONLY_IN_STAGING" ]; then
echo "Keys in STAGING but NOT in PROD:"
echo "$ONLY_IN_STAGING" | sed 's/^/ /'
fi
if [ -n "$ONLY_IN_PROD" ]; then
echo "Keys in PROD but NOT in STAGING:"
echo "$ONLY_IN_PROD" | sed 's/^/ /'
fi
if [ -z "$ONLY_IN_STAGING" ] && [ -z "$ONLY_IN_PROD" ]; then
echo "✅ No env drift detected — staging and prod have identical key sets"
fi
Common Pitfalls
- Committing .env instead of .env.example — add
.envto .gitignore on day 1; use pre-commit hooks - Storing secrets in CI/CD logs — never
echo $SECRET; mask vars in CI settings - Rotating only one place — secrets often appear in Heroku, Vercel, Docker, K8s, CI — update ALL
- Forgetting to invalidate sessions after JWT secret rotation — all users will be logged out; communicate this
- Using .env.example with real values — example files are public; strip everything sensitive
- Not monitoring after rotation — watch audit logs for 24h after rotation to catch unauthorized old-credential use
- Weak secrets —
APP_SECRET=mysecretis not a secret. Useopenssl rand -base64 32
Best Practices
- Secret manager is source of truth — .env files are for local dev only; never in prod
- Rotate on a schedule, not just after incidents — quarterly minimum for long-lived keys
- Principle of least privilege — each service gets its own API key with minimal permissions
- Audit access — log every secret read in Vault/SSM; alert on anomalous access
- Never log secrets — add log scrubbing middleware that redacts known secret patterns
- Use short-lived credentials — prefer OIDC/instance roles over long-lived access keys
- Separate secrets per environment — never share a key between dev and prod
- Document rotation runbooks — before an incident, not during one
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